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NATURAL LAW AND THE GLOBALISATION OF THE CHEAP ENERGY
MIND
KIRK W. JUNKER*
,,riverrun, past Eve and Adam's from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings
us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs
... A way a lone a last a loved a long the"1
Introduction
On the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, the Berlin Declaration decla-
red the period of reflection on the failed Treaty to Establish a Constitution for Eu-
rope to be at an end. To replace it, a reform treaty was signed in Lisbon in De-
cember of 2007, and newspapers from Dublin to Beijing reported on the commu-
nique issued by EU leaders in Brussels that stated ,,The Lisbon Treaty provides
the Union with a stable and lasting institutional framework. We expect no change
in the foreseeable future, so that the Union will be able to fully concentrate on
addressing the concrete challenges ahead, including globalisation and climate
change ..."2 In choosing the problems to highlight in the press release for what
still might constitute the legal framework for Europe in the foreseeable future,
why did these leaders state, and why did these journalists repeat these two issues
together - globalisation and climate change? ,,Globalisation" and the various pro-
cesses it describes as such have already been thoroughly discussed in legal litera-
ture many times over.3
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These are the first and last lines, respectively, of Joyce, Finnegan's Wake, London 1939. En-
ding the sentence at the beginning of the book and beginning the sentence at the end of the
book makes it possible that even this 638 work reads as a cycle.
Smyth, The Irish Times, December 15, 2007, page 1, found at http://www.ireland.com-
/newspaper/frontpage/2007/1215/1197543947005.html and Xinhua, "Lisbon Treaty marks
new beginning for enlarged EU with profound changes," The People's Daily, December 21,
2007, found at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/6325284.html. Emphasis ad-
ded.
See for example Delbriick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets - Implications for
Domestic Law: A European Perspective, in: Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 1
(1993), pp. 9 (10 et seq.); Aman, Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Admi-
nistrative Law, in: UCLA Law Review 49 (2002), p. 1687, Hobe, Die Zukunft des Volker-
rechts im Zeitalter der Globalisierung - Perspektiven der Volkerrechtsentwicklung im 21.
Jahrhundert, in: Archiv des Volkerrechts 37 (1999), p. 253; Dicke, Erscheinungsformen und
Wirkungen von Globalisierung in Struktur und Recht des internationalen Systems, in: Berich-
te der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Volkerrecht 39 (2000), p. 13.
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Likewise climate change is found everywhere in the media. In the Hegelian
spiral4 of human concerns, we have once again arrived at a point when talk of the
environment is fashionable. Is it more than that? Although one says that talk of
the environment is again popular, the spiral of history finds us in a different place
than when we last passed by here. During an address at the University of Pitts-
burgh, former Irish Taoiseach and current EU Ambassador to the USA, John Bru-
ton, stated that climate change is as important an issue for the EU as any issue in
the Balkans.5
The current ,,commodius vicus of recirculation" is not what it was in the late
1960s and early 1970s, for example, when talk of the environment was also at a
crescendo. And although I say ,,talk" of the environment, I do not use ,,talk" dis-
missively - words are important. One might even go so far as to say that ,,things
are the signs of words," rather than the usual notion that words are the signs of
things.6
While in the past, various regions have had problems with their relationships
to the earth that one might call local, the warming of the earth is a problem that is
characteristic of the whole earth - it is global. So what will the pluralism of do-
mestic law or the fragile unity of international law do about the current environ-
mental problems, most notably global warming? Stephan Hobe has well described
the problems in international law that relate to globalisation. Hobe echoes Jost
Delbriick in hinting toward the end of the state on a distant horizon. Delbruck has
coined the terms ,,ent-staatification" and ,,ent-grenzen" (de-statification and ,,de-
bordering," respectively). According to Hobe, if one therefore tries to summarize
a description of globalisation in public law, one could identify the phenomenon of
globalisation as an increase of transnational actors with political negotiation po-
wer, global threats and challenges beyond state and intergovernmental capacities
of regulation and far-reaching changes of societal and political integration.7
,,Of an even greater interest is, however, from a doctrinal point of view the
increasing importance of non-state actors,"8 such as NGOs and multinational or-
ganisations - further evidence that our conception of law changes over time. Take
into consideration for example how the new institutions regard the role of law -
they are present in ,,virtually any international conference and press very hard for
more participatory rights. And they are active in various fields as the examples of
Amnesty International, Greenpeace..., the International Olympic Committee and
the International Chamber of Commerce make evident." Many ,,examples de-
monstrate that the globalised world of today is characterised by two interrelated
tendencies: On the one hand, the control-capacity of the sovereign nation state be-
comes more and more limited and on the other hand, the capacity to act of actors
4 See Hegel, Logik, in: Meiner (ed.), Samtliche Werke, 1928.
5 Bruton, public speech at Student Union Building, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, USA, April 9, 2008.
6 See Burke, What Are the Signs of What? - Language as Symbolic Action, Berkeley 1968, pp.
360-362.
7 Hobe, op. cit., p. 655 et seq.
8 See Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, Berlin 1999.
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of the non-state sector is considerably increased. Apparent examples of this hypo-
thesis are the current problems to find adequate answers against international ter-
rorism."Hobe concludes that it is ,,no overstatement if one asks very seriously the
question of whether or not the era of globalisation marks an end of public interna-
tional law."9 So indeed one could say that we have necessary reasons to re-
conceptualize law. What will lawyers contribute to solving current environmental
aspects of those problems? And what will other persons, professions or institu-
tions do about the problems? My concern is the relationship of globalisation to
climate change.
While Jooking for a few good reasons to go green," Michael Pollan of the
New York Times raises the very good question to everyone (not just lawyers):
,,Why bother?"10 He emphasizes to everyone that looking to law and politics for
answers to environmental problems is the wrong place to look. It may seem to be
ironic, but 1 want to go further and emphasise that point especially to lawyers.
Pollan points out that ,,for us to wait for legislation or technology to solve the
problem of how we're living our lives suggest we're not really serious about
changing - something our politicians cannot fail to notice. They will not move un-
til we do. Indeed to look to leaders and experts, to laws and money and grand
schemes, to save us from our predicament represents precisely the sort of thinking
- passive, delegated, dependent for solutions on specialists - that helped get us in-
to this mess in the first place. It's hard to believe that the same sort of thinking
could now get us out of it.""
Provocatively, Kenneth Burke would even go so far as to say that this attitude
of leaving law to the specialists, to legislate our problems away, has led to consti-
tutions that are at best, ,,business in a mode of mild self-criticism." Pollan's per-
spective is clear from outside the law, looking in. From the perspective of the in-
side of law looking out, what can one see? What can one do? How can law or the
legal profession, in teaching or practice, lend a hand, if not by legislation or even
litigation?12 Well, if law is more than an instrumentality or utility, and is rather al-
so a way of thinking, as when Germans speak of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, or Ame-
ricans speak of teaching students to ,,think like lawyers," or the Copenhagen crite-
ria for accession to the EU requires a state to ,,observe the rule of law," then
perhaps there is something internal to the notion of legal thinking that could help.
9 Hobe, op. cit., p. 657.
10 Pollan, Why Bother? Looking for a few good reasons to go green, The New York Times Ma-
gazine, April 20, 2008, p. 19 et seq.
1 1 Pollan, op. cit., p. 20.
12 See for example Burns/Osofsky (eds.), Adjudicating the Climate: International and National
Causes of Action on Climate Change, Cambridge 2008.
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Problem 1: the Legal Schizophrenia Between Natural and Positive
Law
The well-known Article 38 of the UN Charter, delineating the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, includes, among the sources of law that the court is
to apply, a source that by its English name would be politically incorrect - the
principles of ,,civilized" nations. But more important is that its archaic political
incorrectness, the implication of the phrase principles of international law" belies
a truth of legal psychology as well - we behave as though common principles are
a given, and that position rather assumes a natural law posture. But in practicing
law - especially in practicing private law - we act as legal positivists. It is only
the insightful lawyer, the experienced lawyer, who treats the rule of law just like
the factual assertions of parties; that is, as temporary possibilities, appealing for a
basis to nothing more than that individual's perceptions. I call this mode of con-
temporaneous contradiction ,,legal schizophrenia."
When teaching international law, I find myself constantly in the position of
needing to persuade students - Americans, Irish, Macedonians and Germans -
that international law is law. They often think that without an international police
force or army, there can be no enforcement. Recently, however, I found myself
positioned near the other side of the argument, but for different reasons - not be-
cause international law lacks some necessary element (like enforcement) that do-
mestic law contains, but because, as Pollan points out regarding legislation, law is
equally as ineffective for guiding human behaviour, regardless of whether that law
is domestic or international. We find a striking example of the practice of the legal
schizophrenia in comparative law, when we examine what Zweigert and Kotz,
called ,,praesumptio similitudinus" in their influential work, An Introduction to
Comparative Law. They describe the practice as ,,a presumption that the practical
results [of comparison] are similar."13 This provides us with a good example of
how prescriptions can appear to be mere descriptions. Vivian Curran makes an in-
sightful socio-historical critique of the presumption employed by Zweigert and
Kotz when she sees their social science as being within the ideological perspective
that those oppressed by Nazis were and are as much human as others, and that the-
refore common principles must exist for governing their behaviours and redres-
sing the wrongs upon any of them. Curran's critique may be insightful for many
reasons, but here I wish only to emphasize one. Whatever the socio-historical rea-
sons for the Zweigert and Kotz perspective, Curran's critique demonstrates that
these foundational principles of law have a socio-historical position. And indeed
they must. To bring us back to globalisation and climate change, therefore, and
the question of why one should bother to do anything about the other, and to the
Pollan critique that waiting for law to do something for us is part of the problem
itself, we are left to ask what fundamental principle(s) has put us in this situation,
and to see how we ourselves - not our legislators and not our scientists - can work
13 Zweigert/Kotz, op. cit, p.31.
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our way out of it. The ,,it," according to Pollan's clear focus, is what Wendell Ber-
ry called ,,the cheap energy mind."
Problem 2: The Cheap Energy Mind
While still trying to solve the puzzle called ,,why bother?" Michael Pollan
explains the cheap energy mind, a term coined by Wendell Berry in the 1970s, as
follows: As Adam Smith and many others have pointed out, the division of labour
has given us many of the blessings of our civilization. (Of course, August Comte
also pointed out in volume one of his cours that even in his world of disciplinary
reduction, there needed to be those whose specialization was generalization.14
That is to say, someone must specialize in keeping all the specialists working to-
gether and understanding one another.) Yet it was Smith's notion of specialization
that made cheap energy possible in the first place. ,,Cheap fossil fuel allows us to
pay distant others to process our food for us, to entertain us and to (try to) solve
our problems, with the result that there is very little that we know how to do our-
selves."15 The more biting point that Pollan makes is that it is this cheap energy
that both gives us climate change but at the same time ,,fosters precisely the men-
tality that makes dealing with climate change in our own lives seem impossibly
difficult. Specialists ourselves, we can no longer imagine anyone but an expert, or
anything but a new technology or law, solving our problems. Al Gore asks us to
change our light bulbs because he probably can't imagine us doing anything much
more challenging..."16
As a result we have the ,,cheap energy mind." The ,,cheap energy mind asks
'Why bother?' because it is helpless to imagine - much less attempt - a different
sort of life, one that is less divided, less reliant. Since the cheap energy mind
translates everything into money, its proxy, it prefers to put its faith in market-
based solutions - carbon taxes and pollution-trading schemes. If we could just get
the incentives right, it believes, the economy will properly value everything that
matters and nudge our self-interest down the proper channels. The best we can
hope for is a greener version of the old invisible hand."17 But as Pollan goes on to
discuss, ,,merely to give, to spend, even to vote, is not to do..." I would add to
that, when is legislating or adjudicating the same as doing? They are not; at least
not for those other than the judge or the legislator. These acts of law, like the act
of voting in politics, are what Cicero called regrettable necessities. Why ^egret-
table"? Because they are indicia that we have ceased to act. In a May 7, 2008
broadcast of the radio show ,,The Allegheny Front," Michael Parks, the legal di-
rector of the Group Against Smog and Pollution (GASP) noted that the city of
Pittsburgh has been called the ,,Saudi Arabia of coal." He noted as well that the
14 Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, Paris
15 Pollan, op. cit.,p. 23.
16 Pollan, op. cit., p. 23 (Emphasis added).
17 Pollan, op. cit., p. 23.
18 Pollan, op. cit., p. 23.
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Pittsburgh region has 17/19 of the waste coal plants in the US. The effects of coal
production and use led him to conclude that ,,We need to turn to energy efficien-
cy," not just more sources of energy to be burned the same old way. That same
old way is the cheap energy mind. Parks, a lawyer, has identified the connection
of the cheap energy mind to law.
A Solution: The Individual's Natural Law Mind
Pollan says something that to me, screams for a connection between changing the
cheap energy mind and natural law. He asks whether it matters for one to do so-
mething to reduce COi just to have other persons in other countries increase their
CO2 levels. What does one have to show for the trouble?
"A sense of personal virtue, you might suggest, somewhat sheepishly. But
what good is that when virtue itself is quickly becoming a term of derision?
And not just on the editorial pages of The Wall Street Journal or on the lips of
the vice president, who famously dismissed energy conservation as a 'sign of
personal virtue." No, evening the pages of the New York Times and The New
Yorker, it seems the epithet ,,virtuous," when applied to an act of personal
environmental responsibility, may be used only ironically. Tell me: How did
it come to pass that virtue - a quality that for most of history has generally
been deemed, well, a virtue - became a mark of liberal softheadedness?"19
I like to use a personal teaching anecdote to illustrate by example how we have
institutionalized this loss of virtue. While teaching environmental law to postgra-
duate American law students who were nearly ready for their state examination, I
had invited a biologist to address some issues of water biology contained in Penn-
sylvania's environmental regulations. On the way to the lecture, the biologist, who
had never been in a law school classroom before, asked me what sorts of things
the students talk about. 1 replied with some technical details from environmental
regulations. ,,No, no" she responded, ,,1 mean what sorts of law things do they talk
about; do they talk about justice?" Without meaning to joke, I answered ,,no, these
are upper-level students; they don't talk about justice anymore." I meant it seri-
ously - in the first semester, law professors tell them that policy arguments (and
sadly, justice is considered by many to be at the level of policy only), are the lo-
west level of argument for an advocate. So my biologist colleague gave her scien-
tific lecture. At the end, 1 asked the students why they thought a particular water
standard therefore had been set the way it had. ,,Balancing of interests" was one
answer from a student. ,,Judicial economy" was another student's answer. Then
silence. ,,What about justice?" I asked. Half of the class laughed audibly. I looked
at the biologist - she was horrified. The virtue of justice had been institutionally
categorized as something laughable - for students of the law, no less. Where else
might one hear laughter at justice? In the law of climate change itself- reduced to
19 Pollan, op. cit., p. 19.
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the characterization of ,,mere" virtue. Although emissions trading practices prece-
de the Kyoto Protocol, they are perhaps best known due to the Kyoto Protocol,
and indeed in Europe, the Emissions Credit Trading Scheme of the EU, one of
three ,,flexibility mechanisms" permitted under the Kyoto Protocol, is explicitly
implemented as a tool by which European member states attempt to comply with
the Kyoto Protocol. To earn a tradable credit, a qualifying facility must emit less
air pollution than either the statutory limit or the permit limit for that facility. Ha-
ving done so, the facility may sell the right to emit the tons of carbon (or sulphur)
to a facility that emits more air pollution than either statute or permit allow. But
what is being bought and sold here? Is there a right to pollute? Of course not. If I
drive an automobile under the speed limit, can I sell the extra kilometres-per-hour
that I did not use to someone so that he or she may therefore exceed the limit by
that speed? Of course not. But nevertheless, the expediency of trying to fix a prob-
lem without annoying too many powerful concerns means that anyone choosing
not to pollute is merely exercising personal virtue, and making no real contributi-
on to society.20
Conclusion
Michael Pollan concludes his essay in the Hegelian manner of spiral by noting
that ,,Maybe going green will prove a passing fad and will lose steam after a few
years, just as it did in the 1980s when Ronald Reagan took down Jimmy Carter's
solar panels from the roof of the White House." At this brief moment for reflecti-
on on globalisation and the natural environment, specifically climate change, we
have seen that within the operating principles of law that which can appear to be
descriptive practices of social science can in fact be prescriptions. They can be
prescriptions that function as presumptions, as with Zweigert and Kotz's prae-
sumptio similitudinus, or they can be prescriptions to do nothing in the face of
climate change, as when the vice president of the United States sneers at energy
conservation, damning both the effort and personal virtue itself. It is precisely per-
sonal virtue, institutionalized in the legal mind historically as natural law that
must be called upon for prescriptions. Can these prescriptions help? Maybe. If
they can, it will be the job of lawyers and legal educators to see the subtle power
and contribution to be made by changing the legal mind from the cheap energy
mind that waits for the mechanics of positive legislation to effect change, to one
that takes personal action for that change. Institutions change, sources of law
change, but the concept of law's function must also change from the operation of
law as positive rules imposed from the top downward, to law in the life of indivi-
dual choice.
20 See Junker, Ethical Emissions Trading and the Law, in: University of Baltimore Journal of
Environmental Law 13 (2006), p. 149.
